I Believe In Free Will

[Rey Reynoso]

For the sake of this discussion, I believe in complete free will. Luther was wrong. Edwards is wrong. They deny reality with philosophical constructs. Romans 9 is misinterpreted. John 6 is taken out of context. Ephesians 2 has nothing to do with it.

What say you?

Feel free to attack.

[Aaron Rathburn]

For the link that you asked for to the article on quantum theory and free will, I have them posted on my blog itself. You can see it here:
http://theologyandculture.wordpress.com

Rey Reynoso said:

The texts also show Pharaoh hardening his heart 6 times before God finally getting involved.

Yes, but the entire passage is prefaced first and foremost by God giving instructions to Moses, and Yahweh telling Moses in a very straightforward manner, "I will harden Pharaoh's heart."

Rey Reynoso said:

A drowning man saved by a lifeguard when he holds still isn't saving himself: he's letting the lifeguard save him... It doesn't apply in the physical world I don't see why there's application to the spiritual.

The only problem with this analogy is that it assumes that we are spiritually dying. However, scripture doesn't teach this. Scripture teaches that we are spiritually dead. "And you were dead in the trespasses and sins in which you once walked, following the course of this world...and were by nature children of wrath, like the rest of mankind" (Eph 2).

A more appropriate analogy would be that we are already a drowned, dead corpse floating in the water, and the Redeemer makes us rebirthed into new life.

-ACR

[Rey Reynoso]

Scripture also uses the analogy of stiff necked. And also of groping in the dark but able to grab. And of having poison on the tongue or a mouth as a tomb. I think this is a case of stretching a metaphor beyond what its supposed to be doing. Spiritually dead never means spiritually unresponsive.

Secondly, "Scripture doesn't teach this" means nothing when another interpretative model (such as this one here) shows very ably that Scripture does teach this. At what point was Cornelius an unresponsive spiritual corpse? Was it before he paid alms and offered prayers or after?

Secondly, Scripture also mentions that you're dead to sin. I can bet good money that no one ever argues that they're spiritually unresponsive to sin and yet the same argument is espoused for the counterpoint. Completely unbalanced hermeneutic.

Aaron C. Rathburn said:

For the link that you asked for to the article on quantum theory and free will, I have them posted on my blog itself. You can see it here:
http://theologyandculture.wordpress.com Rey Reynoso said:

The texts also show Pharaoh hardening his heart 6 times before God finally getting involved.

Yes, but the entire passage is prefaced first and foremost by God giving instructions to Moses, and Yahweh telling Moses in a very straightforward manner, "I will harden Pharaoh's heart."

Rey Reynoso said:

A drowning man saved by a lifeguard when he holds still isn't saving himself: he's letting the lifeguard save him... It doesn't apply in the physical world I don't see why there's application to the spiritual.

The only problem with this analogy is that it assumes that we are spiritually dying. However, scripture doesn't teach this. Scripture teaches that we are spiritually dead. "And you were dead in the trespasses and sins in which you once walked, following the course of this world...and were by nature children of wrath, like the rest of mankind" (Eph 2).

A more appropriate analogy would be that we are already a drowned, dead corpse floating in the water, and the Redeemer makes us rebirthed into new life.

-ACR

[mem]

Rey,

It kind of feels like we're talking past each other. Maybe I am a little high from my OTC allergy medication, or maybe I spent too much time fighting crime last night. Hopefully I'm not multiplying words without knowledge here, and that this is a bit more clear.

Also, this got egregiously long. I snipped liberally. If you have questions, you know how to pose them.

Rey Reynoso said:

Free choices then are those choices where there is a chance of choosing an alternate possibility.

The idea of choice among several options is comprehended in the notion that freedom is the ability to do what is right. My point is that the power of contrary choice (i.e., freedom as the ability to choose equally without coercion between contradictory options) is too limited in scope to describe the relationship between God's sovereignty and man's responsibility.

When the possible becomes actual, that can not be changed. The fact you've robbed a bank can't be undone even if you chose that option earlier. The choice of car or cop-shooting or giving up then becomes the action. No one is argueing for freedom of doing the impossible.

To be fair, that's precisely what the argument revolves around in the discussion of election and predestination. That is, is it possible for the unregenerate to choose God?

Ignoring, for the moment, some of the metaphysics, at the very least we can agree that God is constrained by his nature. He cannot sin, for example. Christianity for a long time has maintained that man is likewise constrained, though naturally the reformers treat it differently than, e.g., the Catholics and prevenient grace.

It is a dreadful deception that simply willing is the Good, as opposed to willing Good Things. How? The main argument from determinists is that there is no freedom of choice. It has nothing to do with choosing good things or bad things. Compatibalists try to marry the two by saying freedom is compatible with determinism. For this argument, I'm denying both. In either case I don't see how its dreadful or a lie to have something good out of the possibility to choose otherwise. We applaud it in God. The fact that He's perfect is what makes His choosing Good things to assist us is what makes us say "Wow, how merciful!" so why is it a dreadful deception?

The problem is that it states that merely willing is the good thing. That is, regardless of the inclination of the will, that we simply desire to do something is good, whether the desire itself is good or evil.

I think Scripture contradicts this. I'm cutting some paragraphs here, but see for example Pr 21.27, Pr 28.9, and Ps 109.7 In each case, a good action (prayer, sacrifice) is evil because of who is doing the action.

In other passages, we read that sin is related to our attitudes as much as (if not more than) our actions; so lust becomes adultery and anger murder. Or we read that it's not what goes into a man that corrupts, but what comes out.

What the Scriptures teach us about man is that he, like God and in God's image, is constrained by his nature. Reprobate man has a nature inclined solely to evil; the regenerate experience a war between flesh (evil) and spirit (good). It is in the end that we are really emancipated, finally delivered from our sinful nature.

I think that arguing that freedom is found in the power of contrary choice ultimately requires that we make bad choices. Choices imply consequences, and the consequences themselves coerce our decisions. If I want to prove that my choices are really uncoerced, then I have to choose the worst option. This, of course, is pride and folly.

[D. Iohan Fausten]

I can't believe I overlooked this discussion. What fun!

Tangent Warning

mem said:

at the very least we can agree that God is constrained by his nature. He cannot sin, for example.

I can't agree to this. Unless we agree to an anthropomorphized entity (and I don't) by the name of God, this is a human/rational limitation on an otherwise inhuman/transrational being/thing/entity/whathaveyou. As with most things—fire, bacteria, murder taking human life, sex—it is more a matter of intent (or use) that determines the perspective or lens through which it is seen. God may or may not be able to "lie" (or sin) but the real question is whether or not you would actually understand it as a "lie" (or sin) since you already have a presupposition that God cannot lie (or sin) therefore you would interpret that lie (or sin) as the truth (or as not sin). That actually says more about your nature than the nature of God.

[Rey Reynoso]

To be fair, that's precisely what the argument revolves around in the discussion of election and predestination. That is, is it possible for the unregenerate to choose God?

Well, what does "choosing God" even mean? Determinists have changed the conversation by making the argument about one of choosing God (as if he were an apple behind a foggy class, locked in a cage while we hate apples) over sin (as if it's a big juicy orange that's not only in front of us, we're licking it). Determinists would say "No. It is only possible if God chose them first" and add a bunch of caveats to that usually ending with mystery. It makes sense within the logical construct determinism has created but not much sense in light of what the Bible teaches.

Ignoring, for the moment, some of the metaphysics, at the very least we can agree that God is constrained by his nature.

Well, that's still metaphysics isn't it? lol! Agreed though, God can't sin because sin isn't part of Him (although what I'm about to say is going to give a nod towards Sixth-User-Name-Bishop) We have no problem of God using sin, sending a lying Spirit, sending a Great Lie that could possibly even psyche out the elect! God could do just about anything in regards to sin except, apparently, personally sin (side note: what would be divine sinning anyway? What does it look like for God to murder? Rather, would God's sinning be more in line with His judging? Is it possible that we have made God so transcendent that we don't have a clue how God works? Is it equally possible that maybe God made us in His own image to understand How He works? These are all tangential, by the way so) God can take advantage of sin instead of having sin take advantage of Him. So although (I'll grant) He's constrained by His nature it's not like He can't see that aspect of the current (or really any and all)reality.

Christianity for a long time has maintained that man is likewise constrained, though naturally the reformers treat it differently than, e.g., the Catholics and prevenient grace.

Yes, constrained but that doesn't mean that Humans can't see what righteousness looks like and attest to that's what it is. Even if I granted that human's can't do good (which I won't) it's not like they can't see good, understand it for what it is and even abuse it. Now if you're saying no one is capable of doing any Salvific Good that is altogether different: its outside the realm of viable options for humans because humans are being judged on an infinite scale. The finite cannot save the finite from the infinite: it's a metaphysical impossibility.

The problem is that it states that merely willing is the good thing. That is, regardless of the inclination of the will, that we simply desire to do something is good, whether the desire itself is good or evil.

I'm stupid so I'm not seeing what you're saying. I'm saying that when you drive down the highway it has real exits and they're available to you. It sounds what you're saying is that the reason you go down one exit over the other dictates just how bad you are. I think I agree with you. But that doesn't negate that the highway has real exits. What my argument denies is that Someone messed with the Highway and now it only allows right turns.

(Incidentally it's probably better to argue against Free Will by using the events of the Cross. Internal argumentation won't really work out since options appear actually available to us and one can always argue otherwise. Even with the cross I think there's some answers that the Liberterian would offer but from that route I think it eventually starts backing into the same Corner Calvinists sit at: it's a mystery).

I think Scripture contradicts this. I'm cutting some paragraphs here, but see for example Pr 21.27, Pr 28.9, and Ps 109.7 In each case, a good action (prayer, sacrifice) is evil because of who is doing the action. In other passages, we read that sin is related to our attitudes as much as (if not more than) our actions; so lust becomes adultery and anger murder. Or we read that it's not what goes into a man that corrupts, but what comes out.

And I still think I agree with you, if I'm reading right. Actions are tainted because sinners are tainting them. It doesn't mean the actions weren't real actions nor does it deny that the choices to do those things weren't real choices.
I don't know how this denies my previous point regarding non-determined, incompatibalistic freedom. It's not like I'm arguing that humans can go and choose the impossible ("I will now do good every day of my life and thus be saved" or "I will now fly to heaven") since they stand on an infinite moral scale.

What the Scriptures teach us about man is that he, like God and in God's image, is constrained by his nature. Reprobate man has a nature inclined solely to evil; the regenerate experience a war between flesh (evil) and spirit (good). It is in the end that we are really emancipated, finally delivered from our sinful nature.

What does "Inclined solely to evil" mean? Does it mean the reprobate just does evil? Does it mean he can't see Good? Does it mean he can't acknowledge good?

I think that arguing that freedom is found in the power of contrary choice ultimately requires that we make bad choices. Choices imply consequences, and the consequences themselves coerce our decisions. If I want to prove that my choices are really uncoerced, then I have to choose the worst option. This, of course, is pride and folly.

Freedom would not merely mean contrary choice: but the possibility of alternate possibilities. There are real possibilities available to the reprobate. Even if consequences influence decisions there are still real options and they could choose otherwise. The consequence of trusting God at the Cross is self-suicide and it's at this point that pride goes one way and folly the other; depending on which possibility becomes reality.
Freedom of will is that the alternate possibility is really there. It hasn't been dictated.

[mem]

Rey Reynoso said:

Well, what does "choosing God" even mean? Determinists have changed the conversation by making the argument about one of choosing God (as if he were an apple behind a foggy class, locked in a cage while we hate apples) over sin (as if it's a big juicy orange that's not only in front of us, we're licking it). Determinists would say "No. It is only possible if God chose them first" and add a bunch of caveats to that usually ending with mystery. It makes sense within the logical construct determinism has created but not much sense in light of what the Bible teaches.

So what is the conversation supposed to be about, then? Maybe this is where we're going astray?

To be clear, I'm not a determinist, though I do believe that God must regenerate us before we can believe.

We have no problem of God using sin, sending a lying Spirit, sending a Great Lie that could possibly even psyche out the elect!

Indeed. He works all things together for good.

So although (I'll grant) He's constrained by His nature it's not like He can't see that aspect of the current (or really any and all)reality.

Sorry for snipping the tangent—it is interesting, and probably at some point pertinent. I think this sentence goes with what you wrote below:

Yes, constrained but that doesn't mean that Humans can't see what righteousness looks like and attest to that's what it is. Even if I granted that human's can't do good (which I won't) it's not like they can't see good, understand it for what it is and even abuse it. Now if you're saying no one is capable of doing any Salvific Good that is altogether different: its outside the realm of viable options for humans because humans are being judged on an infinite scale. The finite cannot save the finite from the infinite: it's a metaphysical impossibility.

I guess I kind of thought we were talking about Salvific Good the entire time.

What I've been trying to maintain is that I think the Scriptures present a view of man's will that is best understood by thinking of freedom as the ability to do what is right.

As far as I can tell, we see that God's grace extends providentially to all, if not salvifically.

The problem is that it states that merely willing is the good thing. That is, regardless of the inclination of the will, that we simply desire to do something is good, whether the desire itself is good or evil.

I'm stupid so I'm not seeing what you're saying.

I doubt the problem is with your stupidity; it's probably my articulation.

There are some—I don't think in this thread—who believe that simply having a will is what is Good, and that its inclination is immaterial.

(Incidentally it's probably better to argue against Free Will by using the events of the Cross. Internal argumentation won't really work out since options appear actually available to us and one can always argue otherwise. Even with the cross I think there's some answers that the Liberterian would offer but from that route I think it eventually starts backing into the same Corner Calvinists sit at: it's a mystery).

I'm not sure exactly what you're driving at. If you mean that our experience witnesses to us that we have and make real choices, I agree.

But if I were to make an argument about Jesus Christ, I would say that he had a truly free will.

And I still think I agree with you, if I'm reading right. Actions are tainted because sinners are tainting them. It doesn't mean the actions weren't real actions nor does it deny that the choices to do those things weren't real choices.

Right. I think we agree on this.

What does "Inclined solely to evil" mean? Does it mean the reprobate just does evil? Does it mean he can't see Good? Does it mean he can't acknowledge good?

It means that what good he does is done from a self-oriented perspective, not a God-oriented perspective.

Freedom would not merely mean contrary choice: but the possibility of alternate possibilities. There are real possibilities available to the reprobate. Even if consequences influence decisions there are still real options and they could choose otherwise.

My point is that the choices themselves coerce the will. If we define free as "uncoerced" (which isn't necessarily what you're saying, I realize), then we're in a bit of a bind, since to demonstrate the lack of coercion the best way is presumably by picking the choice with the least favorable consequences.

If you're speaking of freedom as allowing alternate possibilities, I suppose you could model it loosely on a non-deterministic finite state machine (and I do mean loosely). I think omniscience tends to rule out the possibility of multiple futures, though.

[Rey Reynoso]

Mem, I think there's a paper online (if I can find it again) where William Lane Craig has a system of omniscience that is compatible with free will and makes a way out of having a deterministic model while simultaneously having God determining something.

In effect, its multiple possible worlds where People are free and elect. So in one world, its just adam and eve who are "elect" and the world ends there. Then another world just Israel and the world ends there...etc.

The nature of the current world is that you freely believe and then you know you exist in a world where you are a creature that believes. So even if determinism is somewhat true, its true because the reality God has chosen is one in which your free action is simultaneously true.

Does that make sense? Like Crisis in Infinite Earths where there's some earths where Superman is actually Batman because of how events turned out: God can know all without affecting the freewill of creatures, and God can also know all possible futures without affecting the free wills of any creature. The reality He chooses from (since He Himself is acting) winds up being the actual one, not evidenced until the actions of the free agents are seen.

He argues for it based on God not only knowing the future but the possible future (ie: If the works done in Jerusalem would have been done in Sodom they would have long repented).

Anyway, this whole discussion I tend to lean more toward a compatibalistic model myself but Craig's argument is pretty convincing.

[Jennifer]

Hey Rey,
I think Dr. Craig is a Molinist so this might help you search.

Rey Reynoso said:

Mem, I think there's a paper online (if I can find it again) where William Lane Craig has a system of omniscience that is compatible with free will and makes a way out of having a deterministic model while simultaneously having God determining something.

In effect, its multiple possible worlds where People are free and elect. So in one world, its just adam and eve who are "elect" and the world ends there. Then another world just Israel and the world ends there...etc.

The nature of the current world is that you freely believe and then you know you exist in a world where you are a creature that believes. So even if determinism is somewhat true, its true because the reality God has chosen is one in which your free action is simultaneously true.

Does that make sense? Like Crisis in Infinite Earths where there's some earths where Superman is actually Batman because of how events turned out: God can know all without affecting the freewill of creatures, and God can also know all possible futures without affecting the free wills of any creature. The reality He chooses from (since He Himself is acting) winds up being the actual one, not evidenced until the actions of the free agents are seen.

He argues for it based on God not only knowing the future but the possible future (ie: If the works done in Jerusalem would have been done in Sodom they would have long repented).

Anyway, this whole discussion I tend to lean more toward a compatibalistic model myself but Craig's argument is pretty convincing.

[Rey Reynoso]

Jenn, thanks: the wiki article actually links to the post located here.

Jennifer said:

Hey Rey,
I think Dr. Craig is a Molinist so this might help you search.

[Rey Reynoso]

To be clear, I'm not a determinist, though I do believe that God must regenerate us before we can believe.

Mem, you've intrigued me. You're not a determinist yet you believe in some sort of in time necessary regeneration to believe. Can you work that out for me to see how it looks? I admit, I'm actually really interested in hearing what that is.

So what is the conversation supposed to be about, then?

About supporting a form of free will that denies determinism and allows the individual to be a culpable moral agent unlike the deterministic model which in effect, denies the culpability of the moral agent by not allowing him or her options other than those that have been pre-determined. In other words: People are free to choose because God didn't choose individuals. They have real options.

When it comes to belief, its not a magical moral formula that is a saving work that winds up earning salvation: that's not the point of the Bible at all. Here's a story.

An abused dog hates humans. Runs from them. Along comes a human that doesn't beat him. A human that reflects what it is to be a good master. What it is to feed animals. How it is to take care of animals. The dog always runs from the man but sees the human how the human is patient and waiting for the animal and giving morsels. The human proves himself trustworthy and the dog has learned to trust--even if its fear and hatred is still there. It doesn't like humans but this human has proved trustworthy so it takes its knowledge, its experience and trusts the human.

The human takes it to a new shelter--out of the rain, out of the trash. The human cleans it. The human gives the dog a home. The human gives the dog a new name. The dog every now and then can't stand the human and tries to run but then just keeps realizing the wonder of the human--how it treats him, how its effectively brought him out of the pits. The human speaks of one day completing everything for the dog--bringing the dog to his own house. Being completely free of the fear and the trash.

The day comes, at the very end where the human walks the dog through the pearly gates of the mansion. Not one point during the entire process was the dog coerced: the dog had the possible option (like other dogs in the neighborhood) to go running into the dark. Not once is the dog applauded for trusting the human...the human was the one who proved trustworthy and thus engendering trust in a creature that could see what's Evil and see what's Good. Now, the dog has found the ultimate Good but not on account of its own will or striving to find it: the human came close, it came near, it put food in its very mouth.

[mem]

I think we must be using the same word different ways, Rey. I've been reading "fatalism" when you write "determinism." Is that what you mean? Because determinism by itself doesn't really imply no moral culpability, while I think fatalism would.

I am not a fatalist. I do think the fall made us less human, and that a part of that is a broken will. The issue is not whether or not the choices have changed, but that my chooser is broken.


While it's hard to take the issues in isolation, there are two principle questions I think you need to answer. If you have, then please accept my apologies for either not reading it carefully enough, or for being too dense to pick it out of the analogy. Feel free to point me to the posts you think best would discuss this. The first is how and to what extent the fall injured the human will, and the second is how the will is redeemed eschatologically.

As far as I can tell, you agree that we cannot choose impossibilities (though certainly we desire them sometimes). I think the fall certainly made heaven a human impossibility, and that it requires an act of God to fix that. I think you agree with this, but I don't understand what you think a broken chooser means, practically speaking. I would try to place this in the context of your analogy, but having spent the better part of an hour, I think it's best for you to do it.

With respect to the second, I think we also agree both that we'll be free in heaven and that we will not have the ability (or desire) to sin. I don't understand how your view of free will works in this case. It seems symmetric (and opposite) to fallen man's condition.

[Chen Yew Lin]

Freewill means that we can choose to have God and enjoy Him or choose to leave Him and suffer for not having Him. Although He created us and belong to Him and He has ownership over us, so to say, we still have the freewill to go our own independent way.

The first time, Adam and Eve did not really get it. And now God gives all of us another chance through the gospel. We can choose to accept forgiveness and return or we can still choose not to believe or accept forgiveness. This time, we should know better the consequences.

Regarding the impossible things, with God all things are possible. This impossible things (that are possible) do not include those that are against His will and nature but only means that nothing is too difficult for God. In Christ, the blind will see, the deaf will hear and the lame will walk.